

## COVERT INTERVENTION IN CHILE, 1970–1973

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“Do you want to be responsible for electing a communist as president of Chile?” These words were those of the senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer in Santiago, the station chief, Henry Heckscher, a man who had served the CIA since the beginning in 1947 and was veteran of covert actions in Guatemala and Laos. The United States government was debating whether to intervene, secretly, in the 1970 presidential elections in Chile, and Heckscher found himself at cross-purposes with the American ambassador, Edward M. Korry, who was instinctively opposed to intervening.

The question seems a caricature, but it struck a deep chord in Korry. Heckscher’s question underscores the practical—and ethical—questions that run through decisions about intervening secretly in the politics of foreign countries. This case describes those decisions and their effects in Chile between the period leading up to the 1970 elections and the military coup that overthrew and killed President Salvador Allende, a self-proclaimed Marxist, in September 1973.<sup>1</sup>

### BACKDROP TO INTERVENTION

Korry had arrived in Chile in October 1967, two years before Heckscher’s rhetorical question. His attitude toward communism had been shaped by his experience as a journalist in Eastern Europe after the war, and he had been recruited to diplomacy by the Kennedy Administration, which was on the lookout for liberal anticommunists. He thought about it and decided that, yes, Allende was a communist who would destroy democracy in Chile, albeit by democratic means.

“Responsibility” also had a specific force for Korry. Kennedy, he thought, had encouraged public and private American money to flow to Chile under the Alliance for Progress. Korry regarded himself as a “fiduciary” for that investment. He could not simply walk away from that responsibility by remaining aloof while Allende took the Chilean presidency.<sup>2</sup>

As early as April 1969, the U.S. government had begun to shape its approach to the 1970 elections. At a meeting in Washington of the 303 Committee—the interagency committee within the executive charged with reviewing major covert action proposals—Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms had warned Henry Kissinger, then assistant to the President for national security affairs and chairman of the committee, that the CIA needed to start early if it was to repeat its successful perfor-

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mance in the 1964 Chilean elections. Kissinger, however, deferred the issue for the time being.

So-called election projects, like Chile in 1964, had been prefigured by the stunning CIA success in the 1948 Italian elections, when secret CIA money helped the Christian Democrats stave off a severe Communist challenge. In Chile, secret U.S. intervention was a factor in almost every major election. In 1964 the CIA spent more than \$2.6 million in support of the Christian Democratic (PDC) candidate, Eduardo Frei, in large part to prevent Allende's accession to the presidency.

More than half the PDC campaign chest was furnished by the CIA. Frei was not formally told of the support; whether he was aware of it in some sense is another question. In addition, the CIA "station"—CIA officers working under the cover of the U.S. embassy—secretly supported an array of pro-PDC interest groups and passed money to two other political parties in an attempt to spread the vote.

The CIA assisted the Christian Democrats in running an American-style campaign, complete with polls, voter registration, and get-out-the-vote drives, as well as covert propaganda. In a curious parallel between the covert and overt, the CIA station in Santiago was sent additional officers for the project, which was mounted in secret, with all the paraphernalia of its public counterparts: leaflets, campaign posters, and chalkboards toting up the results in tense backrooms. The secret campaign was managed in Washington by an interagency election committee composed of White House, State Department, and CIA officials.

Against this past involvement, a hands-off policy in 1970 seemed tantamount to indifference to the fate of democracy in Chile; it could even be regarded as pro-Allende. Or so Heckscher argued to Korry. Later, once Korry had made the argument his own, he used it on Washington. In June 1970 when senior State Department officials were reluctant to increase funding to the anti-Allende project, Korry cabled, "If Allende were to gain power, how would the U.S. respond to those who asked what actions it had taken to prevent it?"

By the time Korry had decided that Allende was indeed a "communist," the Chilean presidential election had turned into a three-man affair. Frei was barred by the Constitution from succeeding himself, and his party was represented by Radomiro Tomic. There was little love lost between Frei and Tomic, a man well to the left of Frei who was unhappy about having to run on the President's record; Tomic at one point made overtures to the Marxist left. On the right, the National Party, buoyed

by its good showing in the 1969 congressional elections, nominated seventy-four-year-old former President Jorge Alessandri.

Allende was once again the candidate of the Left, this time organized into a Popular Unity coalition that included both Marxist and non-Marxist parties. Allende's platform called for nationalization of the copper mines and other major sectors of the economy, accelerated agrarian reform, wage increases, and improved relations with socialist and communist countries.

## DECIDING ON "SPOILING OPERATIONS"

In December 1969, Korry and Heckscher reached a compromise and forwarded to Washington a joint proposal: the CIA would be authorized to undertake propaganda and other activities to block an Allende victory but would not be given the green light to pass money to either of Allende's opponents. The proposal was held for the time being, however, because the 303 Committee was split. The State Department, represented by Undersecretary U. Alexis Johnson, continued to express qualms about whether the United States should become involved at all. For its part, the CIA believed that Alessandri, then the best bet to stop Allende, needed both money and active help in managing his campaign.

On March 25, 1970, the 303 Committee, renamed the 40 Committee, did approve an initial \$135,000 for "spoiling operations" along the lines of the embassy/station proposal. (The Committee name changes were a half-hearted attempt to maintain some confidentiality; both "303" and "40" were the numbers of National Security Council directives reauthorizing the group.) On June 18 Korry submitted a two-part proposal: the first was an increase in funding for the spoiling operations, the second was \$500,000 for a contingency plan to influence the outcome of the Chilean Congress's vote between the top two finishers, a vote stipulated by that nation's Constitution in the event that no candidate received a majority of the ballots.

Again, the State Department was reluctant—its reluctance eliciting Korry's rhetorical question about responsibility. State agreed to increase funding for the spoiling operations but spoke against the contingency plan, and a decision on the latter was deferred pending the results of the September 4 elections. The 40 Committee met again on August 7, but did not discuss support for either of Allende's opponents. On September 4, the fears of American officials were confirmed: Allende won a plurality,

though not a majority, with 36.3 percent, Alessandri was second with 34.9 percent, and Tomic trailed with 27.8.

While the CIA's covert operators in the Directorate of Plans (DP) acted, the other side of the Agency, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), assessed the prospect of an Allende victory. Ironically, however, the walls of secrecy in effect in 1969 meant that the assessors wrote in ignorance of what their colleagues the operators were up to.

The assessments came in several forms, of which National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were and are the best known. NIEs were agreed assessments produced by the entire American intelligence community, not just the CIA; dissenting agencies registered their views in footnotes.<sup>3</sup> American intelligence produced one NIE on Chile per year between 1969 and 1973; in addition, Chile was the subject of several Intelligence Memorandums and Intelligence Notes, prepared by the CIA and State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, respectively.

NIEs had the predictable defects of the quasi-judicial process that produced them: they often were least-common-denominator compromises, with disagreements obscured in woolly language, not highlighted. They were seldom decisive for senior policymakers, who, for better or worse, were more likely to pay attention to special analyses prepared for them, or even to single bits of raw intelligence. Yet they did represent "the government's" best assessment and, while classified, received a wide circulation within officialdom.

The 1970 NIE, written in July before the September elections, was controversial within the community, the division paralleling that over covert action. The views of the pessimists prevailed, with some qualifications, in the NIE: an Allende victory would mean the gradual imposition of a classic Marxist-Leninist regime in Chile. Democracy would survive for several years, but Allende could, the NIE noted, take Chile a long way down the road toward a Soviet-style East European communist state in the six years of his tenure. He would face obstacles—the military, the Church, the Christian Democrats, the Congress, and some unions—yet a temporary consumption boom would give him a chance to secure control of Congress in the 1973 elections. Chile was headed toward socialism of the Marxist type by the *via pacifica* (peaceful road).

Henry Kissinger once quipped to reporters that "Chile is a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica!" For their part, intelligence analysts drafting NIEs shied away from offering explicit assessments of the threat posed by an Allende Chile; those judg-

ments depended on definitions of American interests and so were regarded as the competence of policymakers, not intelligence assessors.

A CIA Intelligence Memorandum issued just after the September Chilean elections, however, did conclude that the United States had no vital interests within Chile, that the global balance of military power would not be significantly altered by an Allende regime and that his victory would not pose a threat to the peace of the region. What an Allende victory would do was threaten the cohesion of the hemisphere and represent an advance for Marxist ideas, a psychological setback for the United States.

On the likely course of Chile's relations with the socialist world, in particular Cuba and the Soviet Union, the 1969 NIE predicted that *any* new Chilean administration, socialist or conservative, would broaden Chile's foreign relations. However, it noted that Allende in particular would be deterred from moving too far toward the communist countries by Chilean nationalism, which would oppose the tutelage of Moscow or Havana as much as that of Washington.

#### FROM "SPOILING OPERATIONS" TO "TRACK II"

Having failed covertly to prevent Allende's first-place finish, Washington decided to take the next step and try to prevent his seating by the Chilean Congress. When it became apparent that Frei, the outgoing President, would not connive in that effort and that the Congress could not be budged without him, yet a third covert approach—the so-called Track II—ensued.

Four days after the election, on September 8, the 40 Committee met in Washington. The meeting concluded by requesting the embassy to prepare a "cold-blooded assessment" of the "pros and cons" of a "military coup organized with U.S. assistance."<sup>4</sup> Korry responded on the 12th with a pessimistic assessment, one shared by his CIA station:

Our own military people [are] unanimous in rejecting the possibility of meaningful military intervention. . . . What we are saying . . . is that opportunities for further USG [U.S. government] action with the Chilean military are nonexistent.

At the center of both embassy and station pessimism was the figure of the Chilean commander-in-chief, General René Schneider, a staunch constitutionalist known to be opposed to any coup.

The 40 Committee met again, on September 14, to discuss several variants of so-called Frei gambits. One of these was, in the words of a CIA post mortem, a “Rube Goldberg” scheme which would see Alessandri elected by the Congress on October 24th, resigning thereafter to leave Frei constitutionally free to run in a second election for the presidency.” Another variant, labeled with inventive locution the “constitutional coup,” sought to achieve the same end by having Frei voluntarily yield power to an interim military regime, again followed by fresh elections.

Korry was asked to approach Frei about the schemes, and the 40 Committee authorized \$250,000 for “covert support of projects Frei or his trusted team deem important.” The money was never spent, for the only proposal for using it that arose—bribing Chilean congressmen to vote against Allende—was quickly perceived by both the embassy and station to be unworkable.

The day after the 40 Committee meeting, Helms was called to the Oval Office to meet with President Richard Nixon. Nixon told Helms to prevent Allende from taking office; the effort was to be kept secret from not just the secretaries of state and defense, but also Korry in Santiago. Helms’ hand-written notes of his meeting with the President convey the urgency of his order: “One in ten chance perhaps, but save Chile! . . . not concerned risks involved . . . no involvement of Embassy . . . \$10,000,000 available, more if necessary . . . make the economy scream.”

This second line of covert action, dubbed “Track II” by those CIA and White House officials who knew of it, owed something to a continuing series of contacts between the U.S. government and private Americans with stakes in Chile. In April 1970, a month after the 40 Committee approved spoiling operations, a group from the Business Council on Latin America met with Assistant Secretary of State Charles Meyer, who had joined the administration from a career as a Sears Roebuck executive in Latin America. The group sought positive support for Alessandri, the only candidate who opposed expropriations. The board chairman of Anaconda, one of the giants of the Chilean copper industry, C. Jay Parkinson, said his and other interested companies were willing to put up \$500,000 to block Allende’s election.

Meyer was noncommittal and Korry expressed his opposition in characteristically colorful language when he heard of the meeting.<sup>5</sup> Alessandri, the candidate of the rich, could afford to fund his own campaign. Moreover, for the United States to move

beyond the covert anti-Allende spoiling operations to actually support the Chilean right was bound, in Korry’s view, to backfire.

Over the summer, John McCone—a former DCI but now a member of the board of directors of ITT, of which in 1970 Chile’s national telephone company was a subsidiary—approached Helms about a joint CIA-ITT program to assist Alessandri. In 1964 during McCone’s tenure as DCI, private companies had offered \$1.5 million to support Frei against Allende. The 303 Committee, however, rejected the offer, thus setting a precedent. To the committee, the mingling of private motives and public purposes did not seem quite honorable. Moreover, CIA officers worried that the collaboration would make it harder to keep the election operation secret.

Nevertheless, contacts between ITT and the CIA continued. In July, after a colorful ITT public relations man named Harold Hendrix had met with a CIA official in Santiago, McCone again contacted Helms. He arranged for the ITT head, Harold Geneen, to meet William Broe, the CIA’s Western Hemisphere division chief. Geneen in turn offered Broe a million dollars for a pro-Alessandri campaign. The CIA rejected the offer, but did advise ITT how to pass the money, in secret, to Alessandri. Later, the CIA also advised ITT how to pass money to the National Party, a channel comprising two CIA “assets”—that is, Chileans in the employ of the station who were at the same time getting Agency CIA money to carry out the spoiling operations.

As the September elections approached, CIA officials remained in contact with ITT, both in Santiago and in Washington, and continued to provide advice. In all, some \$250,000 in ITT money went to the Alessandri campaign, \$100,000 to the National Party; according to CIA documents, the station informed Korry of the CIA role in the former but not the latter. (Other U.S. businesses contributed another \$350,000, but the CIA had no role in those subventions.)

These private-public contacts continued after the elections, when a concerned Geneen asked McCone to get in touch with Helms again. Before Helms responded, however, Track II was set in motion. Augustin Edwards, the publisher of *El Mercurio*, the major Santiago daily and a long-time Allende foe, was also a Pepsi-Cola bottler and long-time friend of Pepsi-Cola’s president, Donald Kendall, himself Nixon’s friend and political ally. Edwards came to Washington to predict doom and plead the Chilean opposition’s case (and his own). Kendall, impressed, arranged for Edwards to meet Helms. He also arranged a breakfast with Henry Kissinger and John

Mitchell, the attorney general, for the morning of September 15, the day Nixon called Helms to the White House to open Track II.

Helms later thought these contacts made a difference:

I have the impression that the President called this meeting at which Track II was started] because of Edwards' presence in Washington and what he heard from Kendall about what Edwards was saying about conditions in Chile and what was happening there.<sup>6</sup>

## TRACKS I AND II

Track I—the Frei gambits—and Track II were operationally distinct; Track II was tightly held in the extreme. Yet the two tracks were less distinct in substance. Track II explicitly sought a military coup; as instructions to the station put it as early as September 21: “Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Paramilitary legerdemain [Frei gambit] has been discarded. Military solution is objective.”

Track I was prepared to countenance, even support, a coup, provided Frei was willing to take the lead. To goad Frei or the military into action, the 40 Committee had asked, on September 14, for a continuation of the earlier CIA “scare campaign” designed to touch off a financial panic or political instability in Chile. Indeed, by the time Allende took office several CIA propaganda assets—Chilean journalists who were paid, secretly, to plant items provided by the station—had become so visible that they had to leave Chile.

The United States also attempted to make its propaganda come true by orchestrating economic pressure on Chile—cutting off all official credits, pressing multinational firms to curtail investments in Chile, and approaching other nations to urge them to do likewise. Helms' notes from the September 15 Track II meeting included the notation “make the economy scream,” and economic leverage was the topic of another White House meeting on the 18th. To manage this economic squeeze, another interagency working group, composed of the CIA's Western Hemisphere division chief and representatives from State, the NSC, and Treasury, operated parallel to the 40 Committee.

Though Korry was unaware of Track II, his cabled September 21 situation report to Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Meyer, the latter also unaware of Track II, reflected the tone of the economic campaign, in Korry's vivid prose rather than bureau-

cratic jargon:

Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile. Hence, for Frei to believe that there will be much of an alternative to utter misery . . . would be strictly illusory.

By September 29, the 40 Committee had concluded that only economic pressure would induce the Chilean military to act.

In the month between mid-September and mid-October, the two tracks moved together, though the operational separation was continued. The 40 Committee instructions of September 14 had authorized Korry and other “appropriate members of the Embassy Mission” to intensify their contacts with Chilean officers to see if they would support the Frei gambits, and Korry's September 21 situation report had argued that in order to make the gambit work, “if necessary, General Schneider would have to be neutralized, by displacement if necessary”—apparently a reference to a coup.

As the prospects for either Frei gambit grew bleaker and bleaker, and as official Americans in both Santiago and Washington became correspondingly more desperate, those contacts with the military expanded. On September 23 the station in Santiago reported that there were “strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor Schneider will act.” When Frei made no attempt to dissuade his own party convention during October 3–4 from reaching a compromise with Allende, any hopes for the Frei gambits ended.

American covert attention turned to the Chilean military in general and, given Schneider's unwillingness to move against Frei, to lower officers in particular. The same September 23 CIA cable—along Track II—said that “overtures to lower echelon officers (e.g., Valenzuela. [General Camilo Valenzuela, commander of the Santiago garrison]) can of course be made. This involves promoting Army split.”

Along Track I Korry was authorized, successively, to tell his military contacts that if Allende were seated, no further U.S. military assistance would be forthcoming; that assistance and military sales were being held in abeyance pending the results of the October 24 vote, this in response to Korry's own request; and, on October 7, that

if a successful effort is made to block Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the cuts we have thus far been forced to make in Chilean MAP [military assistance] and otherwise increase our presently programmed MAP for the Chilean Armed Forces. . . . If any steps the military should take should result in civil disorder, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver support and material that might be immediately required.

## ORGANIZING FOR TRACK II

The marching orders for Track II, as relayed to the station on September 19, were to

- Collect intelligence on coup-minded officers;
- Create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation, and terrorist activities intended to provoke the left to give a pretext for a coup;
- Inform those coup-minded officers that the U.S. government would give them full support in a coup short of direct U.S. military intervention.

In another cable the same day, headquarters offered its advice about how to create a “coup climate”:

It still appears that . . . coup has no pretext or justification that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will probably be their claim to a coup to save Chile from communism. . . . You may wish include variety of themes in justification of coup to military . . . : (A) Firm intel. that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence services along Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating structure for police state . . . (B) Economic situation collapsing . . . (C) By quick recognition of Cuba and Communist countries Allende assumed U.S. would cut off material assistance to Armed Forces thus weakening them as constitutional barriers. Would then empty armories to Communist Peoples Militia with task to run campaign of terror based on alleged labor and economic sabotage. (Use some quotes from Allende on this.)

CIA officers managing Track II felt under pressure from the top to perform a task they regarded as unpromising. To Thomas Karamessines, the head of the Directorate of Plans at the time, Kissinger “left no doubt in my mind that he was under the heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was placing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished.”<sup>7</sup>

Track II had caught the CIA unprepared. In July 1969 the station had secured headquarters approval for developing assets within the Chilean military to gather information on coup-plotting. This was classic espionage: using money or other inducements to get people to report, secretly, on their colleagues and institutions. Espionage and covert action are close kin, for espionage agents can be asked to act, not just report. To do so, however, raises the risk for the asset of being found out. In Chile, moreover, by the autumn of 1970 the station’s two assets in the military were not in a position to spark a coup.

In the circumstances, it was not that the CIA officers running Track II were necessarily opposed to a coup if that was what it took to prevent Allende’s accession. However, Frei would not act, Schneider would block any coup-mongering if he could, and those officers who wanted a coup were unorganized and unpromising. For example, the station chief in Santiago was moved to caution his superiors several times:

Bear in mind that parameter of action is exceedingly narrow and available options quite limited. Feel necessary to caution against any false optimism. It is essential that we not become victims of our own propaganda. Urge you not to convey impression that Station has sure-fire method of halting, let alone triggering coup attempts.

For his trouble, the chief was cabled on October 7: “Report should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on action taken.” To reinforce the point he was recalled to Washington, where the message was explicit: we are all under pressure to produce, so take your orders as we take ours.

The station thus improvised. It had one piece of good luck. The U.S. Army attaché in Santiago, Colonel Paul Wimert, shared with his Chilean counterparts a traditional military keenness for horsemanship, and so went riding nearly every morning with members of the Chilean high command. On the station’s request, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)—the reporting channel for attachés—agreed to loan Wimert to Track II.

The message Wimert then received through CIA channels evoked the pressure and secrecy surrounding Track H. Wimert was directed

to work closely with the CIA chief, or . . . his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal military figures who might play a decisive role in any move which might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.

Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense Attaché [Wimert's immediate superior in the Embassy] of this message. . . .

This message is for your eyes only, and should not be discussed with any person other than those CIA officers who will be knowledgeable. CIA will identify them.

The special CIA Track II task force in Washington was led by David Phillips, a CIA officer with experience in covert action in Latin America dating back to the CIA's overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenze in 1954; he was called back from Brazil. Other than task force members, only four CIA men knew of its existence: Karamessines, Broe, Broe's deputy, and the head of the Chile branch, who met daily.

To complement Wimert, the task force sent four agents to Chile posing as nationals of countries other than Chile or the United States—"false-flag" officers, in tradecraft terms. "We don't want to miss a chance," as headquarters put it to the station. These agents received their instructions from headquarters, not the station, and in Santiago were not known to one another.

### SUPPORTING . . . AND TRYING TO PULL BACK

Such prospects as existed for a coup centered on loose groups of plotters focused around two men. One was a cashiered brigadier general named Roberto Viaux; the other was General Camilo Valenzuela, the commander of the Santiago garrison. Viaux, an erratic character, had been forced out of the army after leading the "Tacnazo" in October 1968. The Tacnazo—after Tacna, the Chilean city in which it occurred—ostensibly intended to dramatize the military's demand for better pay, but widely interpreted as a coup attempt, was amateurish but came close to success. Viaux retained the support of many noncommissioned and junior officers, and he was the leader of several right-wing "civilian" groups.

Between October 5 and 20, the station and Wimert, mostly the latter, recorded some twenty-one contacts with military and Carabinero (national police) officers, but by the middle of the month the Track II task force regarded prospects as bleak. It and the station had arrived at Viaux as "the only military leader willing to block Allende," but that choice had been reached "by process of elimination," even though his own colleagues, including Valenzuela, described him as "a general without an army." The station's frustration was apparent in a

cable it sent to Washington during this period, though the message's punch was diminished by the propriety of CIA communications officers: "What we need," the station cabled, "is not weapons, what we need is a Chilean general with b—s."

Wimert made the first contact with Viaux through a military attaché from another country; because of the risk of disclosure, the third-country agents took over the contact. As early as October 5, Viaux wanted several hundred tear gas grenades to launch a coup on the 9th. Then, and several days later, the CIA turned down those requests, essentially buying time while encouraging Viaux to refine his plans. To ensure some U.S. influence with him, the station was authorized on the 13th to pass him \$20,000 in cash and promise him \$250,000 in life insurance. By then it was clear to the station that Viaux, who had met with Valenzuela at least once, would deal with his "Schneider problem" by kidnapping him.

On the 15th, nine days before the congressional vote, Karamessines met with Kissinger and his deputy, Alexander Haig, at the White House to review the bidding. They agreed to "defuse the Viaux plot, at least temporarily," because the CIA judged it could not succeed and to pass Viaux the message that:

We have reviewed your plans . . . and come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities in the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. . . . You will continue to have our support. This message was relayed to the station the next day and passed on to a Viaux associate the day after.

However, Viaux could not be defused at Washington's whim; the United States had lost whatever control it had. At meetings on the 17th and 18th, the associate stressed that they would go ahead on the 22nd "and that the abduction of General Schneider is the first link in chain of events to come." At this point the CIA broke off contact with the Viaux plotters but did sustain what it called an "emergency channel"—that is, a way to get a message to him if need arose.

Task force attention had shifted to plotters around Valenzuela, perhaps a general *with* an army. On the 17th, Wimert met with two officers in that circle, who asked him for tear gas grenades, three machine guns, and ammunition. Headquarters was puzzled by the request: ". . . find our credulity stretched by Navy officer leading his troops with sterile [not traceable to their source] guns. What is special purpose for these guns?"

The plotters had told Wimert the guns were for self-defense," and despite its puzzlement, headquarters said it would try to "send them whether you can provide explanation or not." As a first installment intended to demonstrate U.S. support, six tear gas grenades originally designated for Viaux were passed to the officers late in the evening of the 18th, and the guns were sent from Washington by diplomatic pouch on the morning of the 19th.

Valenzuela told Wimert, also on the 18th, of a complicated coup plan beginning with the abduction of Schneider at a dinner in his honor the next night. He would be flown to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave the country, and a military junta would dissolve the Congress. Viaux, who knew about the plan but was "not directly involved," would be safely—and visibly—out of Santiago for a few days. The military would not admit to the kidnapping but would instead blame it on leftists.

This bizarre plot failed when Schneider left the dinner in a private car, not his official one, and the police escort remained with him. Wimert's contacts assured him another attempt would be made the next day, and Wimert was authorized to pay Valenzuela \$50,000, "the price agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors," but only after the kidnap was completed. The second attempt also failed; given the second failure, the task force concluded that "the prospects for a coup succeeding or even occurring before 24 October now appear remote.

Nevertheless, at 2:00 A.M. on the 22nd, Wimert met his contact in an isolated section of Santiago and passed the machine guns and ammunition.

Shortly after 8:00 A.M. that same day, Schneider's car was intercepted as he was driven to work. He pulled his handgun to defend himself and was shot.

The station was uncertain, but its first reaction was that the guns it had passed were those used in the abduction. It informed headquarters that it had instructed Wimert to "hand over \$50,000 if Gen. Valenzuela requests," which also suggests that it believed the killing was the work of Valenzuela's paid abductors. Later in the day, with Schneider still clinging to life, the station added: "All we can say is that attempt against Schneider is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity to prevent Allende's election if they are willing to follow Valenzuela's scenario."

In the event, while martial law was declared, with Valenzuela himself as chief of Santiago province, the station's prediction of October 9 proved on the mark: if Schneider were shot in an attempted kid-

nap, that would "rally the Army firmly behind the flag of constitutionalism." Allende was confirmed as President on the 24th, and Schneider died the next day.

It is probable that in fact the CIA-supplied weapons were not used in the killing and that the officers to whom they had been passed were not directly involved in the shooting. The Chilean military court found that Schneider had been killed with handguns, not machine guns, and neither the army officer who had received the machine guns nor his navy ally were present at a meeting of the abductors before the shooting. Viaux received a twenty-year sentence for being the "author" of the kidnapping, along with a five-year exile for plotting a military coup. However, Valenzuela was also convicted of the latter charge and sentenced to three years in exile.

## KEEPING THE OPPOSITION ALIVE

In November 1970, after both Tracks I and II had failed, Salvador Allende was seated as President of Chile. The following February, in his State of the World message, President Nixon set the public line of American policy toward Allende's Chile: "We are prepared to have the kind of relationship with the Chilean government that it is prepared to have with us." This "correct but minimal" line had grown out of the earlier interagency study, National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 97, and was set forth secretly in National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 93 in November 1970.

Assistant Secretary of State Meyer elaborated that line in testimony before a Senate committee, though he skated just to the edge of a lawyer's fine distinction in describing previous U.S. actions about which he did not want to speak, particularly before Congress in open session:

The policy of the Government . . . was that there would be no intervention in the political affairs of Chile. We were consistent in that we financed no candidates, no political parties before or after . . . September 4. . . . The policy of the United States was that Chile's problem was a Chilean problem to be settled by Chile. As the President stated in October of 1969: "We will deal with governments as they are."<sup>8</sup>

The policy sought to put pressure on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and contain its effects in the hemisphere, while the "correct" posture on the surface would deny Allende a handy foreign enemy against which to rally domestic

support. One instrument of the policy was economic pressure, both overt and covert aid—cut off, credits denied, and efforts, partially successful, to enlist international financial institutions and private firms in tightening the squeeze on Chile. The other instrument was covert action. During the Allende presidency, the 40 Committee authorized over seven million dollars in covert support to Chilean opposition groups. Six million of that was actually spent; adding project funds that did not require 40 Committee approval, the CIA spent a total of about seven million dollars on covert action in Chile between 1970 and 1973.<sup>9</sup>

In broad outline, the covert support was intended to keep opposition parties and media, especially the Christian Democrats (PDC), the National Party (PN), and *El Mercurio*, alive to fight another day. Thus, it is intriguing to compare the presumptions of that covert support with what the intelligence community's assessors were writing—again recognizing the wall of secrecy between planning for covert action and estimating Chile's future.

The 1971 NIE, issued in August after Allende had held power for nine months, was more optimistic about prospects for democracy in Chile than the previous year's version. Allende was popular but had a long, hard way to go to consolidate a Marxist leadership; that outcome was not inevitable. In fact, while up to that point he had taken great care to observe constitutional forms and would want to continue doing so, he was judged likely to have to use techniques of more and more dubious legality to perpetuate his control.

The next NIE came out in June 1972. By then the prospects for the survival of democracy in Chile appeared better than at any time since Allende's inauguration. The system had been remarkably resilient. Elections of all sorts had continued normally, and pro-government forces had abided by results that went against them. Opposition parties in Congress had been able to stall government initiatives and curb Allende's power; opposition media had survived government intimidation and sustained its criticism. The NIE predicted that over the next year Allende was likely to slow the pace of his revolution to accommodate the opposition and so preserve the gains he had made.

One final NIE was prepared before Allende's overthrow in September 1973. It did not predict that coup: it noted the polarization in Chile was eroding Chile's tradition of compromise but gave only an "outside chance" to a move by the military. Its best bet was a political stand-off, for Allende had not consolidated power even though he was able and

popular and even though low-income Chileans believed he had advanced their interests.

On other sensitive issues too, the tone of assessments over Allende's term indicated less, not more, cause for concern. For example, as Chile expanded its links to the communist nations, the 1971 NIE stressed that Allende was careful not to subordinate Chile's interests to them nor to risk a rupture with any noncommunist nation on which Chile depended for aid. The 1971 and 1972 NIEs both emphasized Allende's independent, nationalist course and his commitment to nonalignment.

By 1971, the NIE described Cuban-Chilean relations as distant in ideological terms but closer economically. Despite Allende's long friendship with Fidel Castro, he had refrained from dramatic overtures toward him. The next year's NIE judged that Havana had been circumspect in using Chile as a base for revolution in the hemisphere.

By 1972 the NIE characterized Soviet attitudes as cautious and restrained lest Moscow antagonize the United States or incur an open-ended economic commitment to Chile. Those same themes, and particularly Soviet unwillingness to make a Cuba-sized economic commitment to Chile, were underscored in a State Intelligence Note written after Allende's December 1972 visit to the Soviet Union.

On the possibility of Chilean subversion in the hemisphere, a CIA Intelligence Memorandum of September 1970 noted that Chile had long been relatively open to extreme leftists and would become more so under Allende. However, a State Intelligence Note of June 1971 said that contrary to earlier indications that Allende might provide some assistance to insurgents in neighboring countries, he had been careful to avoid actions that would strain relations with those neighbors. Latin American expatriates residing in Chile had been warned they could do so only if they did not engage in political activities; some of the more zealous expatriates had been asked to leave.

In sum, the Note concluded, Allende was unlikely to assist the export of insurgency. The 1972 NIE said that Allende had taken pains to convince his Latin American neighbors that he did not share Castro's revolutionary vocation. While some revolutionaries in Chile had received arms and money from groups in Allende's coalition, that probably had not occurred at Allende's behest.

The irony is that these estimates were drafted without reference to ongoing covert action. Hence the 1972 estimate that the Chilean opposition was durable was written without knowledge that the opposition was receiving covert American funding.

There was no estimate of whether the opposition would survive *without* American funding.

### COLLECTING INFORMATION AND SENDING SIGNALS

After Allende was seated as President, the CIA began to rebuild its contacts in the Chilean military; again, as before September 4, the purpose was information-gathering on coups, not on trying to foment them. Viaux and Valenzuela were both gone from the scene, but many of the officers from whom the CIA now sought information were aware of earlier American support for a coup, and so they must have been particularly sensitive to any signals that they again had that support.

Moreover, as Karamessines later testified, from his perspective, "Track II was never really ended."<sup>10</sup> It just petered out in changed circumstances; the task force was disbanded, and Phillips returned to Brazil. Nixon and Kissinger turned to other matters but retained their distaste for Allende. Karamessines' subordinates, aware of the feelings of the President and the national security adviser, and knowing their boss to be a man who played by the book, did not put him on the spot with the White House by seeking confirmation that, yes, the United States was no longer interested in a coup.

Communications between station and headquarters in the autumn of 1971 testify to the fact that there was no clean end to Track II. By September the station had built a new network of agents and was receiving almost daily reports of coup plotting. The station requested guidance about how to use this new network, noting that developing more military sources would make the United States "a bit pregnant" by inevitably signaling some encouragement to plotters.

In November the station cabled, suggesting that the ultimate goal of its penetrations of the Chilean military was a coup. At CIA headquarters, Broe's deputy was in charge of the Western Hemisphere Division while awaiting Broe's successor. Instead of sending a telegram, which would have gone to Karamessines and put him on the spot with the White House, the deputy sent a written despatch to Santiago. It was more philosophical than most bureaucratese, and also pithier.<sup>11</sup>

Its basic message to the station was: report history, don't try to make it. The CIA did not have 40 Committee authorization for coup plotting. In any event, Chilean commanders could not be pushed into a coup but had to take the decision on their own. At the same time, he acknowledged the fuzzy

line between monitoring coups and appearing to support them, and he recognized that the mere existence of contact with the military plotters, for whatever purpose, might be taken by them as American support for their future political purposes.

That said, however, the station was still authorized to put the United States in a position to "take future advantage of either a political or a military solution to the Chilean dilemma," depending on how events played out.

The blurring of the line between espionage and action became a reality in a more specific exchange between station and headquarters, one parallel to their dialogue about the purpose of military contacts. This concerned a "deception operation" intended to alert Chilean officers to Cuban penetration—real or purported—of the Chilean armed forces. Strikingly, the new American ambassador in Santiago, Nathaniel Davis, who arrived as both sets of internal CIA discussions were taking place, was informed of neither.<sup>12</sup>

The first set of discussions was regarded as internal housekeeping, making sure that station and headquarters agreed on the standing instructions. In the instance of the deception operation, the CIA apparently exploited some combination of the transition between Korry and Davis and a loophole in the then-White House instructions for informing ambassadors of covert activities. Since the deception materials actually were passed outside Chile, they became a third-country operation, not one on which the ambassador in Santiago had to be informed. And, with Track II shelved but not dead, it, too, might have been seen to provide authority for keeping Davis in the dark.

In September 1971, the station proposed to provide information, some of it disinformation prepared by the CIA, to persuade senior Chilean officers that, with Allende's connivance, the Carabineros' intelligence unit was working with Cuban Intelligence to gather information prejudicial to the Chilean high command. Headquarters responded the next month by suggesting that, instead, the station pass "verifiable" information to the coup plotter then regarded as most likely to succeed.

In the end, headquarters agreed to another station request, and in December a packet of material, including a fabricated letter, was passed to a Chilean officer outside Chile. The station never reported what effect, if any, the "information" had, and, contrary to initial plans, no further packets were passed. During the same period, however, the station did briefly subsidize a small antigovernment pamphlet distributed among the military.

At other points during the Allende regime, the station compiled what it regarded as operational intelligence necessary in the event of a coup—arrest lists, key government locations that would need to be taken over, other places and people that would need to be protected, and government contingency plans in the event of an uprising. According to the CIA, none of this information ever was passed to the Chilean military. Nor, since the information was regarded as CIA housekeeping, was the ambassador informed.

Through 1972 and into 1973 the station focused on the group it earlier had judged most likely to bring off a successful coup; by January 1972 the station had penetrated that group and was in contact through an intermediary with its leader. Rumors of coups swirled around Santiago. The station's monitoring peaked during two periods—June 1973, and the end of August through the first two weeks of September—before the coup that succeeded.

It did worry some Washingtonians that the United States would be held responsible for a coup it had not promoted. At CIA headquarters, the same deputy who had written the philosophical despatch in November 1971 was again minding the store in an interim between two chiefs. Apparently on his own initiative, he sent two cables to the station in May 1973. The first, on the 8th, represented “a rather abrupt departure” from CIA custom in pointing out “the probability of an opposition move against Allende and the inevitability that CIA would be blamed as the instigator of any coup.” The second, responding to a station reply, told the station to do the best it could at “ringing the gong”—predicting the coup-but stressed that it was more important to keep “the CIA's record clear.”<sup>13</sup>

### SUPPORTING THE OPPOSITION OR PROMOTING A COUP?

Within the shared objective of keeping the opposition alive, the policy debate—in Washington, within the American embassy in Santiago, and between the two—was narrow but frequently sharp: where to draw the line between supporting opposition forces and assisting those who actively sought to overturn the Allende government?

Within that narrow debate, the “doves”—those who resisted covert involvement with the antigovernment agitators—generally won the day. For instance, during Track II the CIA had passed \$38,500 through a third party to *Patria y Libertad* (Fatherland and Liberty), a right-wing para-military

organization, as part of the effort to build tension in Chile and thus a pretext for a military coup. After Allende assumed the presidency, the CIA occasionally passed the group small amounts of money for demonstrations or other specific activities. That support, which totalled only about \$7,000, was ended in 1971 as *Patria y Libertad* became more and more militant.

The debate over the limits of covert action grew heated in 1972 and 1973 as strikes by Chilean shopkeepers and others became the focal point of anti-government protest, and the question arose whether the United States, through the CIA, should support private-sector groups that might be involved in strikes. In September 1972 the 40 Committee authorized \$24,000 in “emergency support” to a business organization, the Society for Manufacturing Development (SOFOFA), then in serious financial difficulty. At the same time, however, on Ambassador Davis's recommendation, the Committee decided against support to other private-sector organizations “because of their possible involvement in anti-government strikes.”

The next month, however, the 40 Committee did approve \$100,000 for SOFOFA and two other private-sector groups, the Confederation of Private Organizations (CAP) and the National Front of Private Activity (FRENAP). For the CIA, this support was part of the larger project to influence the March 1973 legislative elections and was limited to voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives. When those elections failed to produce the two-thirds opposition majority in the Chilean senate that might have led to Allende's impeachment, the focus of opposition shifted away from votes and toward strikes—and the policy dilemma for American officials emerged once again.

The CIA did, however, begin to support a research organization that was spun off from SOFOFA, and in 1973 provided three-quarters of its funding. This project was justified as research, not political action. The organization provided a steady flow of economic and other analyses to opposition groups; it actually drafted many of the bills submitted by opposition parliamentarians.

In the middle of July 1973, Chilean truckers began a strike that lasted until Allende's overthrow on September 11. The point of the strike was explicitly political: to paralyze the country so that the military would have to intervene—or at least re-enter the Allende government—to restore order. In this context, official Washington reviewed a number of proposals for covert assistance to private-sector groups.

Again, Davis and the Latin Americanists at the State Department were reluctant, for those groups were known to hope for military intervention, and so support for them would take the United States across the line between supporting the opposition and seeking a change of government. On the other side of the argument were many CIA officers, who found themselves with high-level support from Davis's boss, Henry Kissinger, then about to move from the White House assistant to secretary of state.

On August 20, the 40 Committee approved a million dollars for opposition parties and private-sector groups, though passage of the money was contingent on the concurrence of the ambassador. None of that money actually was passed to the private sector before the coup intervened, three weeks later.

In the middle of these discussions, the station asked headquarters to take soundings in Washington to see if support to the opposition could be stepped up to include groups like the truck owners. Davis agreed to the soundings but opposed a specific proposal, forwarded by the CIA at the same time, for \$25,000 for the strikers. It is unclear whether that proposal came before the 40 Committee. On August 25, sixteen days before the coup, headquarters cabled the station that it was taking soundings, but the specific proposal for aid to the truckers never was approved.

The dilemma for policymakers was all the harder because the political parties, the militant trade unions (*gremios*), and the paramilitary groups prepared for violence were interconnected in a number of ways, many of them known to the CIA. It is thus possible that *Patria y Libertad* and a kindred group, the Rolando Matus Brigade, received CIA money secondhand through the parties.

Moreover, the truckers got money from *some-where*. That much was apparent to all in Santiago. The first strike, in October 1972, coincided with the American decision to support the private groups, though the intended purpose of that assistance was the elections, not strikes. The next month the CIA

did learn that, contrary to its stipulations, one private group had passed \$2,800 to the strikers. It rebuked the group but still passed it more money the next month.

Plainly, those Chileans in the opposition did not want merely to exist; they wanted to succeed, though they differed in what actions they were prepared to take in that quest. Moreover, as Davis later put it: "The U.S. government wished success to opposition forces. . . ." <sup>14</sup> Even if those forces the U.S. supported abided by CIA strictures on the use of its money, the result still freed their own resources for other purposes. And *their* paramount purpose was the end of the Allende government.

The station received regular reports throughout July, August, and September on what was afoot among the group of plotters that acted on September 11, so the United States had *some* foreknowledge of the coup. The Chilean plotters, however, decided to proceed only a few days before acting; they apparently also decided not to inform the United States of their plans. On Saturday, the 8th, the embassy had indications of a coup on Monday, which over the weekend was postponed until Tuesday, a change of which the U.S. had clearer and clearer intimations during Monday. <sup>15</sup>

Did the United States share some of the responsibility when Allende was overthrown and killed on September 11, even though the CIA had not been directly involved? In testimony before the Senate in 1975, Karamessines, when noting that Track II never really ended, said, "I am sure that the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973. I do not have any question about that in my mind. . . ." <sup>16</sup> Or as William Colby, the DCI in 1973, put it:

Certainly in Track II in 1970 it [the CIA] sought a military coup. . . . Certainly, having launched such an attempt, CIA was responsible to some degree for the final outcome, no matter that it tried to "distance" itself and turn away well before 1973. <sup>17</sup>

## NOTES

This case is based on Gregory F. Treverton's *Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

1. Unless otherwise cited, the basic sources for the case are two documents produced by the Senate Select Committee . . . [on] Intelligence Activities, on which the author served: *Covert Action* and, for Track II, *Alleged*

*Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, respectively, Hearings and Interim Report of the Committee, 94 Cong., 1 sess. (December 4 and 5, 1975), vol. 7, and (November 20, 1975). Hereafter cited as *Covert Action* and *Assassination Report*, respectively.

2. See Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York: Knopf, 1979), p.

223. See also the fascinating exchange between Korry and Senator Richard Schweiker in *Covert Action*, pp. 41–45. Schweiker said: “. . . I think the most ridiculous argument I’ve heard in these hearings this year is to say because we voted for the Alliance for Progress, that this is a covert action trigger” (p. 45).

3. The Chile estimates are described in *Covert Action*, pp. 43–48, on which the following account is based.

4. This and other secret Track II documents cited are from *Assassination Report*, pp. 227–35.

5. See Powers, pp. 226–27.

6. Helms testimony, cited in *Assassination Report*, p. 228.

7. Testimony cited in *Assassination Report*, p. 235.

8. *Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 93 Cong. (1973), Part 1, p. 402.

9. *Covert Action*, p. 27ff.

10. Testimony quoted in *Assassination Report*, p. 254.

11. This account is pieced together from *Covert Action*, p. 38; and interviews with Phillips, the deputy and other CIA officers, in Nathaniel Davis, *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 314–15.

12. Davis, pp. 311–13.

13. David Atlee Phillips, *The Night Watch* (New York: Atheneum, 1977), pp. 238, 274. The second cable is also mentioned in William Colby and Peter Forbath, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), p. 305.

14. Davis, p. 329.

15. This sequence is reported by Davis, p. 360. It generally squares with other accounts.

16. As quoted in *Assassination Report*, p. 254.

17. Colby, p. 305.

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Treverton, Gregory F. *Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

## COVERT INTERVENTION IN CHILE, 1970–1973

Gregory F. Treverton

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This case is intended to serve some combination of three purposes:

- An introduction to the policy issue of covert action;
- A vehicle for specific discussion of policy choices about it; and, especially as
- a way to frame the ethical implications of those choices.

### STARTING POINTS

The discussion might begin at any of a number of points. An obvious one would be Korry's rhetorical question, his debate with Heckscher. Two students might be asked to role-play that argument. That discussion would drift naturally to issues of value: What did "responsibility" mean? In what sense was the United States responsible and why? Did past intervention justify present action?

That would raise two other issues, which might be dealt with in turn: Under what circumstances, if any, might the United States be justified—in practical or ethical terms—in intervening in a foreign country? What is the ethical standard by which

American actions should be judged? In particular, is an argument about American national security interests *ever* enough to justify intervention?

Ethical arguments generally have to be made in terms of broader, if not universal, goals. Democracy might be one, which raises the question of whether Chile's election was tolerably "democratic" and by what standard. And what, if anything, justifies the United States as the imposer of the standard? There is also often buried in arguments for covert action a notion of preemption: modest, even covert, intervention now will forestall the need for more dramatic action later. But that argument is usually made in prudential, national security terms, not ethical ones.

This discussion might be brought to a point in several ways. One would be to try to list *guidelines*, either practical or ethical, for thinking about covert action as a policy choice. Another might be to list various *forms of intervention*—covert propaganda, covert financial support, secret arms transfer and secret training, unacknowledged military operations, and so on. Should we think differently about different forms, either in practical or ethical terms? Defenders of covert action sometimes make, for instance, an argument that it is less than war, and thus more *proportional* to the threat being countered.

Finally, is it worth separating *covert*ness from *intervention*? Does intervening openly make it better in policy terms or more acceptable in ethical terms? Public debate, for instance over Panama, sounded

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as though it did matter. But notice that setting the downfall of Noriega as a *public* objective made an invasion almost inevitable if other means would not do; by contrast, a more discrete, if not secret, effort might simply have been ended with less loss of face. (On the other hand, the United States simply wound up covert operations in Vietnam and Iran when circumstances changed, leaving its former clients to their fate—a moral issue of another sort.)

## OTHER APPROACHES

There are at least two other ways into the case that might be tried instead of, or in addition to, the one outlined above:

*Track II:* Here, perhaps the way to start is with an open question about reactions to it. It is reminiscent of arms sales to Iran in the 1980s in that both reflected the momentum of operations in the context of very unusual secrecy that excluded cautionary voices; in both, the CIA operatives themselves suppressed their dubiety in a good soldierly facade.

*Run-up to the Coup:* Here, what is striking is the narrowness of the debate, which might be role-played, between Davis and his station chief. Again, previous actions cast shadows over current choices; sincere people disagreed, but in retrospect their disagreement looks minor by comparison to the perspective they shared.

## DRAMATIS PERSONAE

Jorge Alessandri  
former President and National Party presidential candidate in 1970

Salvador Allende  
President of Chile, 1971–73

William Broe  
CIA Western Hemisphere Division Chief

William Colby  
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 1973–76

Nathaniel Davis  
U.S. Ambassador to Chile, 1971–73

Augustin Edwards  
Publisher of *El Mercurio*

Eduardo Frei  
President of Chile, 1964–71

Harold Geneen  
President of ITT

Henry Heckscher  
CIA Station Chief

Richard Helms  
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 1966–73

Harold Hendrix  
ITT Public Relations

U. Alexis Johnson  
Undersecretary of State

Thomas Karamessines  
CIA Deputy Director for Operations

Donald Kendall  
President of Pepsi-Cola

Henry Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; then Secretary of State

Edward Korry  
U.S. Ambassador to Chile, 1967–71

John McCone  
Former DCI, Board Member, ITT

Charles Meyer  
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America

John Mitchell  
Attorney General

David Phillips  
Head of CIA Chile Task Force

Gen. René Schneider  
Chilean Commander-in-Chief

Radomiro Tomic  
Christian Democratic Presidential Candidate in 1970

Gen. Camilo Valenzuela  
Commander of the Santiago Garrison

Gen. Roberto Viaux  
cashiered Chilean General, coup plotter

Col. Paul Wimert  
U.S. Army Attaché in Santiago